South Carolina Law Review
Volume 17

Issue 4

Article 5

1964

The Erie Doctrine and State Conflict of Laws
Charles H. Randall Jr.
University of South Carolina School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Randall, Charles H. Jr. (1964) "The Erie Doctrine and State Conflict of Laws," South Carolina Law Review:
Vol. 17 : Iss. 4 , Article 5.
Available at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol17/iss4/5

This Article is brought to you by the Law Reviews and Journals at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in South Carolina Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholar Commons. For more information, please
contact digres@mailbox.sc.edu.

Randall: The Erie Doctrine and State Conflict of Laws

TIE ERIE DOCTRINE AND STATE
CONFLICT OF LAWS
C

Rmzs II.

RANDALL, JR.*

Some of you have heard Professor Thomas Reed Powell's
definition of the legal mind. As I recall it, he said that the legal
mind is the mind that can think of something that is inextricably
intertwined with something else, without thinking of the thing
with which it is intertwined. Our panel found that dividing the
Erie Railroad topic into manageable assignments challenged
the legal mind to the utmost. It's hard to talk about any aspect
of the problem without slipping into another aspect. And it's
harder to discuss the topic at all than it would be to reorganize
the railroad.
My assignment is to discuss choice of law, where it concerns
not choice between federal law and the law of some state, as in
Mr. Knowlton's subject or in Clearfield Trust Co. v. United
States,' but choice between competing rules of two or more
states. This problem, of course, arose and was settled sub silentio
in the Erie Railroad case itself, where Mr. Justice Brandeis
stated the problem to be 2 "whether the federal court was free to
disregard the alleged rule of the Pennsylvania common law."
You will recall that the action arose in southern New York,
based on an injury suffered by Tompkins while he was walking
along the railroad's longitudinal pathway. The defense contended that the Pennsylvania rule treated users of longitudinal
pathways as trespassers, and that this rule should govern. The
plaintiff, of course, not knowing that the judicial universe was
about to be inverted, argued Swift v. Tyson," that the federal
* Professor of Law, University of South Carolina.
1. Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943). For a penetrating analysis of the potentialities of this decision, see Friendly, In Praise of
Erie-and of the New Federal Common Law, 19 RECORD OF THE N.Y.C.B.A. 64
(1964), 39 N.Y.U.L Rav. 383 (1964).
2. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 71 (1938). For discussions of the
general subject matter of this paper, see WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS 187-218
1963); Cheatham, Federal Control of Conflict of Laws, 6 VAND. L. REv. 581
1953) ; Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 50 COLUM. L.
REV. 489, 509-15 (1964) ; Hill, The Erie Doctrine and the Constitution, 53
Nw. U. L. Rav. 427 (1958); Mishkin, The Variousness of "Federal Law":
Competence and Discretion in the Choice of National and State Rules for
Decision, 105 U. PA. L. REv. 797 (1957); Smith, Blue Ridge and Beyond: A
Byrd's Eye View of Federalism in Diversity Litigation, 36 TuL. L. REv. 443
(1962) ; Weintraub, The Erie Doctrine and State Conflict of Laws Rules, 39
IND. L.J. 228 (1964).
3. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
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court should follow its own rule, since there was no state statute
on the matter. The Supreme Court held that Pennsylvania law
must govern, and sent the case back for the district court to determine Pennsylvania law. Not a word in the opinion suggested
that the federal court should consult the "whole law" of New
York to find whether a New York court would apply its own
law or that of Pennsylvania.
Indeed, the question of what state law a federal court should
follow when deciding a case governed by state law is very different from the question whether a federal court should be able
to fashion its own rule, disregarding state rulings entirely. Regarding the choice-of-law question, presumably Congress, under
the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution,4 does have
power in the premises, so that Mr. Justice Brandeis' blanket condemnation of the "unconstitutionality of the Course pursued"6 ,
by federal courts for over a hundred years would not here apply.
Furthermore, the Rules of Decision Act 6 states only that the laws
of the several states shall be regarded as rules of decision "in
cases where they apply." This at least leaves open the question
as to which state's laws apply to a particular case. So neither by
the Constitution nor by act of Congress would it appear a decision was compelled that a federal court must follow the conflicts
rules of the state in which it sat. The decision when made could
be based on discriminating choice, in the light of the needs of
the federal system and the operating therein of the diversity
jurisdiction.
Although the question was earlier intimated, 7 it was not until
1941, in the case of KMaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co.,8 that
Mr. Justice Reed for a unanimous Court laid down what has
come to be known as the Makxon doctrine. I remember a story,
I hope apocryphal, that Air Force pilots enjoyed telling during
the Second World War. The aircraft had a warning device,
called a klaxon, 9 which emitted a horrible scream when the aircraft approached stalling speed without its wheels being down.
The purpose of the device, of course, was to prevent the pilot
from inadvertently stalling the plane, or landing without lower4. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.

5. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 77-78 (1938).
6. 28 U.S.C.A.

§ 1652; see WRIGHT,

FEDERAL

CouRTs

§ 54 (1963).

7. Ruhlin v. New York Life Ins. Co., 304 U.S. 202, 208 n2 (1938).
8. 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
9. WEBSTER, NEW INTERNATIONAL DIcTIoNARY (2d ed. 1936), defines klaxon
as "make a sharp, piercing sound; scream, roar; a trade-mark applied to a
kind of horn used especially on autos."
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ing the wheels. One day a pilot in training school made a beautiful landing on the runway, but unfortunately without having
put his wheels down, and the plane skidded to a grinding halt.
His instructor ran over, and asked why he had not put his
wheels down. The pilot explained, "I just couldn't think. That
damned klaxon was making too much noise."
In conflicts questions in diversity cases, federal judges today
are not supposed to think; they are supposed to listen to the
laxon,.
You will recall that in that case the plaintiff recovered on a
breach of contract claim brought in the Delaware federal court,
on a contract in which almost all the "place of contracting" or
"place of performance" elements were in New York. The question was whether Delaware or New York law should govern
recovery of interest on the judgment from the date of suit.
Speaking for the Court, Mr. Justice Reed laid down a rule embracing not only this case but all diversity conflicts cases:
The principal question in this case is whether in diversity
cases the federal courts must follow conflict of laws rules
prevailing in the states in which they sit.... We are of
opinion that the prohibition declared in Erie ... against

such independent determinations by the federal courts extends to the field of conflicts of laws.... Otherwise the
accident of diversity of citizenship would constantly disturb
equal administration of justice in co-ordinate state and federal courts sitting side by side ....

Any other ruling would

do violence to the principle of uniformity within a state
upon which the Tompkins decision is based ....

It is not

for the federal courts to thwart such local policies by enforcing an independent 'general law' of conflict of laws.' 0
Thus Justice Reed in certain terms stated what might be termed
the "full-blown Kaxon rule," that the question as to which state
law governed an issue in a particular diversity litigation was to
be handled exactly as any question of substantive law in the case,
by looking to the law of the forum state. As Judge Friendly later
said, "the question is not what we think, but what we think the
New York Court of Appeals would think the Supreme Court
of Ohio would think."" In hornbook terms this full-blown
Klaxon rule is the governing rule today.
10. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 494, 496 (1941).
11. Cooke v. E.F. Drew & Co., 319 F.2d 498, 503 (2d Cir. 1963) (dissenting
opinion).
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This rule is subject to one major exception, an exception some
thought might swallow the whole rule: to the extent that the
federal constitution, especially the full faith and credit clause or
the due process clause, inhibits a state from applying its own
conflicts or other rule, the federal court is, of course, equally
bound by the supreme law of the land. For a while, writers
asked whether the conflicts of law was about to become another
branch of federal constitutional law. 12 Any fear of this is now
not well founded.
Consider the case of Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 1 3 decided
in 1953. In this case, the Klaxon rule is the unstated major premise: argument is entirely in terms of the full faith and credit
clause. Plaintiff sued in a Pennsylvania federal court, for the
wrongful death of her husband, who was killed in Alabama. His
death resulted from the bursting of an emery wheel that had
allegedly been defectively made by defendant Pennsylvania corporation. Alabama's wrongful death statute has a two-year limitation period: Pennsylvania's-one year. To provide intellectual
delight to law professors and judges, the plaintiff brought her
diversity action after the one-year Pennsylvania period had run,
but before expiration of the two-year Alabama period. Defense
counsel was armed with a precedent that boded ill for unalert
widows, the case of Rosenzweig v. Heller,14 decided by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in 1951. This case, involving Pennsylvania and New Jersey wrongful death acts and their limitations periods, was what a lawyer friend of mine would call "on
all eights" with the case at bar. Hence, in Simonds Abrasive,
Klaxon applied with a vengeance: there was a tough Pennsylvania decision, much criticized, directly on point. Klaxon was
applied, and the Supreme Court held that the full faith and
credit clause was no bar.
Mr. Justice Jackson, joined by Justices Black and Minton,
dissented in terms that embrace but do not expressly state distaste for the Klaxon decision itself:
Klaxon ... contains language that would seem to make all
conflict questions depend on the law of the forum. But that
was an action of contract in which conflict considerations
prevail that are not present in tort cases. It is but dictum so
12. EHRENZWEiG, CoN tLIcT OF LAWS § 9 (1962) ; Ross, Has the Conflict of
Laws Become a Branch of ConstitutionalLaw?, 15 MiNx. L. REv. 161 (1931).

13. 345 U.S. 514 (1953).
14. 302 Pa. 297, 153 At. 346 (1931).
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far as it touches this statutory tort case. .

.

. The Court's

decision, in contrast with our position, would enable shopping for favorable forums. Suppose this plaintiff might
have obtained service of process in several different statesan assumption not extravagant in the case of many national
corporations. Under the Court's holding, she could choose
from as many varieties of law as of forums. Under our

theory, wherever she elected to sue (if she had a choice),
she would take Alabama law with her. Suppose even now
she can get service in a state with no statute of limitations
or a long one: can she thereby revive a cause of action that
has expired under Alabama law? . . . This case is in United

States Court, not by grace of Pennsylvania, but by authority
of Congress ....

1

Those cases involving what have been called state "door-closing" policies have given particular concern.' 6 Consider Angel V.
Bullington,17 where a North Carolinian bought Virginia land in
Virginia, and defaulted on the purchase price. The seller foreclosed on the land and had the proceeds applied to the price.
Then he sued in a North Carolina federal court to recover the
deficiency. Virginia law permitted actions for deficiency judgments, but a North Carolina statute precluded such actions. If
we ignore as we may' s the complication introduced into the
decision by prior litigation in a North Carolina state court, the
Supreme Court held that North Carolina's law of conflicts must
govern, and if that state says that its statute forbade collection
of deficiency judgments where all significant contacts were in
Virginia, the federal court must follow that rule. The plaintiff
was foreclosed by the prior litigation from arguing that this
violated full faith and credit. Mr. Justice Frankfurter said on
the Mlaxon issue of the case:
The essence of diversity jurisdiction is that a federal court
enforces State law and State policy. If North Carolina has
15. Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U.S. 514, 520-22 (1953).
16. An interesting and potentially important recent decision is Szantay v.
Beech Aircraft Corp., 237 F. Supp. 393 (E.D.S.C. 1965), aff"d, 349 F.2d 60
(4th Cir. 1965). See comments on the Szantay case before the Fourth Circuit

at pp. 631-34 infra.
17. 330 U.S. 183 (1947).

18. HART & WECHSLER, THE FEERa.

COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM

668 n.1 (1953), argues convincingly that both res judicata and Erie R.R.
issues are, in this case, "not alternative grounds of decision but separately
necessary and complimentary ones."
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authoritatively announced that deficiency judgements cannot
be secured within its borders, it contradicts the presuppositions of diversity jurisdiction for a federal court in that
State to give such deficiency judgment. North Carolina
would hardly allow defeat of a State-wide policy through
occasional suit in a federal court. What is more important,
diversity jurisdiction must follow State law and policy. A
federal court in North Carolina, when invoked on grounds
of diversity of citizenship, cannot give that which North
Carolina has withheld. Availability of diversity jurisdiction
which was put into the Constitution so as to prevent discrimination against outsiders is not to effect discrimination
against the great body of local citizens. 19
20
To the same effect is Cohen v. Benefieial Indus. Loan Corp.,
in 1949, in which Mr. Justice Rutledge voiced some objections
to Kaxon:

Erie . ..made no ruling that in so deciding diversity cases
a federal court is 'merely another court of the state in which
it sits,' and hence that in every situation in which the doors
of state courts are closed to a suitor, so must be also those of
the federal courts. Not only is this not true when the state
bar is raised by a purely procedural obstacle. There is sound
historical reason for believing that one of the purposes of
the diversity clause was to afford a federal court remedy
when, for at least some reasons of state policy, none would
21
be available in state courts.
One more decision needs comment, to round out the present
Klaxon doctrine. This is the sister case to Klaxon, decided the
same day, the case of Griffin V. MeCoach.22 To simplify the facts
perhaps to distortion, one Colonel Gordon took out insurance
policies on his life with Prudential, naming as beneficiaries certain New Yorkers who had advanced funds to him for business
transactions in which all were involved. Admittedly, those New
Yorkers had insurable interests in the Colonel's life. Texas has a
criticized and minority view that the assignees of a policy must
have an insurable interest. Some of the New York beneficiaries
assigned their interests to other New Yorkers, unrelated to the
19.
20.
21.
22.

Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183, 191-92 (1947).
337 U.S. 535 (1949).
Id. at 558.
313 U.S. 498 (1941).
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dealings with Colonel Gordon. On the Colonel's death, his estate
sued Prudential in a Texas federal court, to recover the proceeds
of the policies insofar as they had been transferred to persons
without insurable interests. Prudential answered by interpleading the New York claimants, serving them with process in New
York under the nationwide service provision of Title 28.23 Prudential then received a stakeholder discharge, and left the claimants to fight it out. The Supreme Court, again speaking through
Mr. Justice Reed, held that this district court must follow the
law of Texas, including its conflicts rulings, and that Texas
could, consistent with full faith and credit, apply its public
policy to foreclose suit by the assignees in its courts.
These decisions state the present law. To criticize them, it is
appropriate to ask, first, whether the broad Erie Railroad doctrine is sound: and second, if it is, where do the conflicts fit into
it. I believe that Judge Friendly's view, stated so eloquently in
his Cardozo lectures, 24 is correct in his finding wisdom in and
a broad measure of satisfaction with the basic Erie doctrine.
Whether constitutionally compelled, as he says it is, or not, Erie
is the conventional wisdom 25 of the day. Erie recognizes a mean-

ingful area for the operation of state sovereign power. The Rules
of Decision Act plainly recognizes state legislative power in the
premises: it is fully appropriate that state judicial power also
be accorded due respect. The non-Euclidean constitution offered
by Professor Crosskey 26 some years ago has found few if any
adherents, and it is probable that the high-water mark of outright attack on Erie has passed.
If Erie is sound, where do doctrines of the conflict of laws fit
the pattern? The starting point for present intelligent consideration of this question should be the illuminating treatment given
the subject by Professor Cavers in his report to Professor Field's
committee. 27 To me, the most important point Professor Cavers

makes in his directing attention to the current ferment, amount23. 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (1948); 28 U.S.C. §2361 (1948), as amended (1949).
24. Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943).
25. The phrase, of course used in a different context, is that of Professor

Galbraith, in THE AFFLUENT SOCIETY (1958).

26. CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE
UNITED STATES (1953).
27. Cavers, Special Memorandum on Change in Choice-of-Law Thinking
and Its Bearing on the Klaxon Problem, ALI STUDY OF THE DmSION OF
JURISDICTION BETWEEN

STATE AND

FEDERAL COURTS

154-214 (Tent. Draft

No. 1, 1963) ; Currie, Justice Traynor and the Conflict of Laws, 13 STAN. L.
REv. 719 (1961); Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary?, 37 TEXAS L.
Rav. 657 (1959).
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ing to revolution in doctrine, in the field of conflicts itself.28
Analytical tools are here being shaped that may alter the entire
focus of the Kaxon problem, and that promise to make a major
contribution to intelligent federalism.
One aspect of this is the recognition that state rulings on conflicts are not and never have been intellectual exercises to ascertain by application of logic what state's rules should govern. The
conflicts rulings themselves embody determinations of the policy
reach of the statutes and judicial decisions of the forum state.2 9
For instance, in torts conflicts cases, the rule that the law of
the place of wrong governs questions of liability is under attack.
Only the latest blow is the New York state court decision, Babcock v. Jackson,30 in 1963. A New Yorker drove his car, accompanied by a New York guest, into Canada, and the guest was
injured there when the driver negligently ran into a stone wall.
New York permits recovery by a guest from his host on proof
of ordinary negligence. Ontario, where the accident occurred, has
a very restrictive guest statute, which would have barred recovery. The court of appeals applied the New York rule to permit
recovery, reversing lower courts which applied the place-ofwrong rule. The theory of the court was that New York had the
"dominant contacts" with the particular issue involved, that is,
whether recovery should be permitted by a guest against his
host. Judge Fuld said:
Comparison of the relative 'contacts' and 'interest' of New
York and Ontario in this litigation, vis-a-vis the issue here
presented, makes it clear that the concern of New York is
unquestionably the greater and more direct and that the interest of Ontario is at best minimal.31
Decisions not dissimilar have arisen in California, Wisconsin,
New Hampshire, and Pennsylvania ;32 and the same "new look"
28. Id. at 159-66.
29. For a convincing presentation of this thesis, see EHRENZWEIG, CoNFIcr
oF

LAWS 307-359 (1959).

30. 240 N.Y.S.2d 743, 191 N.E.2d 279 (1963). See Cavers, supra note 27,

at 173-180; Cavers, Cheatham, Currie, Ehrenzweig, Leflar, Reese, Comments

on Babcock v. Jackson, A Recent Development in Conflict of Laws, 63 COLUm.
L. REV. 1212 (1963); O'Rourke, Analysis of the Contacts Test: A Numerical
Evaluation of Babcock v. Jackson, 11 PrAc. LAW. 87 (1965); Weintraub, Revo-

lution in the Choice of Law for Torts, 51 A.B.A.J. 441 (1965).
31. Babcock v. Jackson, 240 N.Y.S2d 243, 750, 191 N.E.2d 279, 284 (1963).
32. Griffith v. United Air Lines, 416 Pa. 3, 203 A.2d 796 (1964) ; Thompson
v. Thompson, 105 N.H. 86, 193 A.2d 439 (1963); Haumschild v. Continental
Cas. Co., 7 Wis.2d 130, 95 N.W.2d 814 (1959) ; Grant v. McAuliffe, 41 Cal.2d
859, 264 P.2d 944 (1953).
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is appearing in contracts and other divisions of the law as well.

The point is that if a state's rulings on conflicts questions embody to some extent its feelings as to the policy and reach of its
own substantive law, there is a kernel of Erie Railroad truth in
the Klaxon doctrine. At the same time, there is a federal interest
in these cases, where by hypothesis they have important contacts
with more than one state. The new conflicts doctrine contributes
to giving due weight to each of these factors.34 First, it considers
not what law governs the "case," but what rule should govern a
particular "issue." Second, it asks Mr. Justice Traynor's conflictallaying question, "Is this conflict really necessary?" Is there a
true conflict, considering the policy foundations of the purportedly conflicting rules of the two states? Third, Justice Traynor would have the court weigh the competing policies of the
two states, where a "true" conflict exists, to determine which policy is the more weighty. Now, this approach is exactly what a
federal court might well do in a conflicts case if it were free of
Mlaxon.
With that inadequate setting of the stage, let me briefly discuss suggestions which have been made as to modification of the
Klaxon rule. I take it that many of the cases I have mentioned
in the laxon line are agreed candidates for oblivion. What rule
should be substituted for that which I have called the "fullblown Klaxon rule," the rule that a federal court in a diversity
case should decide conflicts questions as though it were "only
another court of the state."?
The most modest suggestion might be called "the well-tempered Klaxon." This rule would follow state law, but not with
the same rigidity as in following the strictly substantive rules of
the state. 33 Here, the full panoply of Mr. Gibb's suggestions in
his earlier remarks can be advocated. His comments apply with
peculiar cogency to the conflicts area. The federal courts should
have at least as much freedom as a state court below the court of
last resort, and perhaps more. Thus far, I am sure all would go.
A second approach might be termed "muted laxon." If the
forum state has little or no contact with the operative facts of
a controversy, then let the federal court in that forum operate
free of the Klaxon rule. If the forum state has significant con33. Cavers, supra note 27, at 166-73, 180-82.
34. See articles cited, supra note 27, especially that of Mr. Justice Traynor

in 37 TEXAs L. Rav. 657 (1959).

35. Cavers, supra note 27, at 211-12.
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tacts, then apply the conflicts rule of the forum state.36 Especially is this approach useful in a case such as Klaxon itself,
where the danger is that the forum might characterize the issue
as "procedural" and apply its own laws where such application
would be egregious.8 7 A companion approach is the suggestion
that the Supreme Court should more vigorously invoke the full
faith and credit clause as a limitation on the extent to which
states may apply their own rules of conflicts to transactions
essentially extra-state.38
A third suggestion might be termed "Klaxon with selective
amputation." Pushed far enough, this could swallow most of the
rule. In some areas, such as multi-state defamation, or airline
accidents, Congress might enact substantive rules governing liability, thus removing the problem from Klaxon. Alternatively,
the Congress might invoke the full faith and credit clause to
selectively carve out areas of exception. 39 An example of the
latter is the proposal in Professor Field's amendments to the
41
Judicial Code, 40 which would overrule Griffin v. McCoah,
and provide that where federal diversity jurisdiction is invoked
in multi-state, multi-party litigation, where nationwide process
is permitted, the federal court should be free to "make its own
determination as to which state rule of decision is applicable."
Professor Field has looked longer and harder at this problem
than I have. I am not sure that this proposal is not a quotient
verdict: a splitting of the difference among the critics, and that
every policy argument against Griffin does not equally lie
against Kaxon. The argument is that the claimants in federal
statutory interpleader are engaged in litigation that could not
have been brought in any state court anyway, since federal national service is necessary to get them in. Some claimants are
in a foreign forum against their will, when they were beyond
36. Id. at 209-10.
37. On remand in the Klaxon case, the Delaware federal court ruled that a
state court in Delaware would apply the New York rule, characterizing that
rule as "substantive." Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co. v. Klaxon Co., 125 F.2d 820 (3d
Cir. 1942), cert. dened, 316 U.S. 685 (1942).
38. Cavers, supra note 27, at 202-10.
39. These proposals are discussed in Cavers, supra note 27, at 207-09.
40. ALI STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAs COURTS, § 2344(c), (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1965) (relating to multi-

party, multi-state diversity); § 2361(c) (relating to multi-state interpleader) ;
Commentary to §2344(c) at 148; Commentary to § 2361(c) at 159; and Supporting Memorandum C at 193 (relating to constitutionality of the proposed
rules).
41. Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U.S. 498 (1941).
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reach of its normal process. But the plaintiffs in Cohen,42 Angel
v. Bullington,43 and Simonds Abrasive4 4 all probably had the
alternative of sue here or nowhere. In the federal interpleader
statute, if the Guaranty Tqntst 45 view of diversity jurisdiction is
correct, the federal interest ends when the stakeholder wins his
protection against double liability. Then the conflict is over
state law of insurance, and between claimants. If there is a federal interest in which state's law is chosen here, there is a federal
interest in every true conflicts choice.
It is interesting that all these proposals are looked on without
alarm by Professor Cavers, who wishes to preserve the Klaom
rule. 46 It seems that twenty-five years of arguing the case have
narrowed the area of disagreement considerably. Many critics of
Klaxon, would be satisfied to have the felon branded, without
insisting on a hanging. Arguably, the modest proposals so far
suggested, while preserving Klaxon, would overrule every Supreme Court case involving direct attack on Klaxon.
There have been other proposals for modification of KElaon,
such as more vigorous rules of forum non conveniens; some I
have not time to mention, others no doubt I have not even heard
of. One I would like to mention. We could call the rule "PresumptiveZy Klawon." It could rise from the possibility that the
Byrd47 case and Hanna v. Plumer48 might foreshadow some
change in the distant Klaxon area. Would it make federal
sense to have a rule that Klaxon would apply unless there
were judge-discovered "affirmative countervailing considera49
tions at work," to use Mr. Justice Brennen's felicitous phrase.
Admittedly, this suggestion is getting near the borderline of
Swift v. Tyson territory, especially were we to say the appropriate "other considerations" could be the greater weight of
another state's contacts with the events in litigation, or its deeper
policy interest in the outcome on the issue. These new conflicts
insights, espoused so ably by many courts and by Professors
Currie, Cavers and Ehrenzweig, among others, promise to accord new weight to the very interests of federalism that the
42. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949).

43. 330 U.S. 183 (1947).
44. Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U.S. 514 (1953).

45. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1955).
46. Cavers, supra note 27, at 202-14.

47. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Co-op., Inc., 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
48. 85 S.Ct 1136 (1965), discussed at length in the remarks of Mr. KnowNlton at this conference.
49. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Co-op., Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 537 (1958).
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opponents of Klaxon wish to promote. 50 Loosening of the
Klaxon rule would permit federal judges and the federal bar
to contribute to the development of these ideas.
I have little developed the importance of forum-shopping considerations, intra-state or extra-state. Time does not permit developing this line of argument, but with Professor Hart5 1 and
Mr. Justice Harlan, 5 2 I feel that the primary interest of federalism in these questions is on certain and just choice-of-law rules
bearing on the level of primary private activity, not on the litigation stage. Admittedly, the two ideas merge.
Today's world moves faster than does the mind of man. Already Professor Field's sweeping proposals to amend diversity
jurisdiction, if adopted, will alter the underlying premises of
our discussion, in ways that are not completely known. A short
time ago, Professor Sutherland spoke at proceedings in celebration of the anniversary of the great speech by Dean Pound, then
a Nebraska attorney, before the American Bar Association at St.
Paul in 1906. 1 quote a remark of Professor Sutherland, which,
while given in a slightly different content, bears on our efforts
at this Conference. He said this:
I suggest, then, one problem, relevant to Dean Pound's
observations made here in 1906, a problem capable of no
complete solution, susceptible to no impatient improvement,
a problem so evident that much of the time we take it for
granted, we accept its malfunctionings as inevitable payments on the price of our constitutional system. I refer to
those troubles in the American administration of justice
which arise from our Federal structure-troubles which, like
most of man's ills, can never be completely cured, but troubles to whose alleviation we, in this place, on this occasion,
should particularly dedicate ourselves. We shall find
enough to keep us busy.53
The problems that were launched in 1938 with the decision of
the Erie Railroad case are indeed capable of no complete solution, and susceptible to no impatient improvement. The bench
and bar shall, indeed, find enough to keep us busy, in working
to preserve and broaden this great insight into the smooth and
just functioning of our federal system.
50. An early and still valid analysis is found in HART & WECHSLER, THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEm 633-636 (1953).
51. HART & WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM,

(1953).

52. 85 Sup. Ct 1136, 1146 (1965) (concurring opinion).
53. 35 F.R.D. 241, 269 (1964).
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